Publications
6
Dispositional Essentialism and the Fine-Tuning Argument, Synthese (forthcoming)
1
The Fine-Tuning Argument for God’s Existence (FTA) claims that certain recent discoveries in physics — such as the boundary conditions of the universe and the physical laws and constants which characterize it — are precisely fine-tuned for the possibility of intelligent life. In this paper, I defend the necessitarian response to FTA. In particular, I defend dispositional essentialism, the view that all fundamental natural properties are essentially dispositional. This view entails that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary and thus are not fine-tuned for the possibility of intelligent life. In the course of defending this view, I consider and respond to five objections: (i) that it is possible for the laws of nature to be different because we can conceive of them being different, (ii) that metaphysically necessary life-permitting laws still render God’s existence more likely than it would otherwise be, (iii) that FTA can still be framed in terms of deviant causal properties (such as schmass), (iv) that dispositional essentialism succumbs to a vicious regress of powers, and (v) that hyperintensional contexts create insuperable problems for the view. I argue that none of these objections succeed.
Calum Miller has recently argued that the standard liberal and moderate positions on abortion are incapable of substantiating the claim that ’all non- disabled adult humans are equal’. The reason, he claims, is that such accounts base the intrinsic moral worth of a human being on some property (or set of properties) which comes in degrees. In contrast to this view, he argues that moral equality must reside in some binary property, such as the property of being human. In this paper, I offer three criticisms of Miller’s position.
Abortion and the Basis of Equality: A Reply to Miller, Journal of Medical Ethics (2023)
2
Hume, Substance, and Causation: A Solution to a Nasty Problem, Hume Studies (2023)
3
Louis Loeb has identified a “nasty problem” in connection with Hume’s theory of meaning. The problem is that Hume seemingly claims we lack ideas corresponding to key metaphysical terms, such as terms like “substance” and “necessary connection,” but he then proceeds to explain why philosophers believe in the existence of entities denoted by such terms. In short, Hume seems motivated to explain belief in the existence of certain entities, despite his claiming we have no ideas corresponding to them. In this paper, I strive to solve the problem by noting the important role of clear and distinct perception in his thought. In particular, I argue Hume only wishes to deny that we have clear and distinct ideas of substance and necessary connection, and not that we altogether lack any idea of substance and necessary connection, traditionally conceived.
Is Same-Sex Marriage Unjust? Think (2022)
4
A response to James S. Spiegel’s article in which he argues that same-sex marriage is unjust.
A Challenge to Unqualified Medical Confidentiality, Journal of Medical Ethics (2017)
5
Medical personnel sometimes face a seeming conflict between a duty to respect patient confidentiality and a duty to warn or protect endangered third parties. The conventional answer to dilemmas of this sort is that, in certain circumstances, medical professionals have an obligation to breach confidentiality. Kenneth Kipnis has argued, however, that the conventional wisdom on the nature of medical confidentiality is mistaken. Kipnis argues that the obligation to respect patient confidentiality is unqualified or absolute, since unqualified policies can save more lives in the long run. In this paper, I identify the form of Kipnis’s argument and present a challenge to it. I conclude that, as matters stand now, a qualified confidentiality policy is the more rational choice.
Bas C. van Fraassen, in his Terry Lectures at Yale University (subsequently published as The Empirical Stance), is concerned to elucidate what empiricism is, and could be, given past and current failures of characterization. He contends that na€ ıve empiricism—the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of a thesis—is self-refuting, and he offers a reductio ad absurdum to substantiate this claim. Moreover, in place of na€ ıve empiricism, van Fraassen endorses stance empiricism: the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of certain attitudes and commitments. The present article, however, argues that van Fraassen begs the question in his reductio of na€ ıve empiricism, and thus that his primary defense of stance empiricism is inadequate.
Faint Impressions, Forceful Ideas: Hume’s Impression/Idea Distinction, History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis (2021)
A natural reading of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas is that impressions are forceful perceptions whereas ideas are faint. A problem emerges, however, when Hume countenances the possibility of faint impressions and forceful ideas. In this paper, I attempt a resolution to the problem. I argue that Hume characterizes impressions and ideas intensionally and extensionally, and sometimes uses the term in only one of the two senses. I argue that Hume intensionally defines impressions and ideas as forceful perceptions and weak perceptions, respectively, but takes these to be extensionally equivalent to original and copied perceptions, respectively. Hume recognizes that his two characterizations—the intensional and extensional—don’t perfectly match up, and that there are exceptions to the purported equivalences (the exceptions being disease, sleep, madness, and enthusiasm). Nonetheless, I argue that Hume’s willing to proceed with his definitions.
The Pre-eminent Good Argument, Religious Studies (2020)
According to J. L. Schellenberg, a perfectly loving God wouldn’t permit the occurrence of non-resistant non-believers– that is, non-believers who are both capable of believing in and relating to God, but who fail to believe through no fault of their own. Since non-resistant non-believers exist, says Schellenberg, it follows that God doesn’t. A popular response to this argument is some version or other of the greater good defence. God, it’s argued, is justified in hiding himself when done for the sake of some greater good. But proponents of this defence have overlooked or neglected an important sub-argument in Schellenberg’s case– what I call the ‘pre-eminent good argument’. In this article, I identify the nature of the argument and offer a solution to it.
On What Empiricism Cannot Be, Metaphilosophy (2016)